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RUTH M. WORTHLEY, Appellant, v. EDWARD J. 
WORTHLEY J Respondent. 
[1] Divorce-Foreign Decrees-Full Faith and Credit.-Divoree 
decree obtained by husband in Nevada after wife's prior New 
Jersey decree for separate maintenance, being regular on its 
face, must be accorded full faith and credit in California 
where wife does not question its validity. 
[2] Id.-Foreign Decrees-Effect of Divorce on Prior Decree for 
Separate Maintenance.-Since full faith and credit clause 
compels recognition of divorce decree obtained by husband 
in Nevada only as adjUdication of marital status of parties and 
. not of property rights that may be incident to such status, 
effect of dissolution of marriage on husband's preexisting obli-
gations under prior New Jersey decree for separate mainte-
nance obtained by wife must be determined by New Jersey 
law. 
[8] Id.-Foreign Decrees-Meet of Divorce on Prior Decree for 
Separate Maintenance.-Husband's obligations under New Jer-
sey decree are not terminated by dissolution of marriage 
effected by Nevada court ill divorce proceeding instituted by 
husband in which personal jurisdiction over wife was not 
obtained. 
[4] Id.-Foreign Decrees-Judgment for Sepa.ra.te Maintenance.-
Since New Jersey decree for separate maintenance obtained 
by wife is both prospectively and retroactively modifiable, 
California court is not constitutionally bound either to enforce 
or not to enforce husband's obligations under such decree. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d. Divorce and Separation,§ 312 et seq.; Am.. 
Jur., Divorce and Separation, § 740 et seq. 
[2] Foreign divorce as affecting local order previously entered 
for separate maintenance, note, 1 A.L.R.2d 1423. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-3] Divorce, § 304; [4,7-9,11] Divorce, 
1306; [5] Courts, § 94; [6] Cow'ta, § 110; [10] Evidence, 131. 
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[6] Courts-Decisions as Precedents.-Cases are not authority for 
propositions not considered therein. 
[6] Id.-Decisions as Precedents.-Propositions ot law laid down 
in opinions of District Courts of Appeal are not binding on 
Supreme Court. 
['1] Divorce-Foreign Decrees-Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement 
of Support Act.-In proceedings commenced pursuant to provi-
sions of Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act 
(Code Civ. Pl'OC., § 1650-1690) California courts must recognize 
and enforce foreign alimony and support decrees whether modi-
fiable or not (§ 1670), and must afford defendant an oppor-
tunity to litigate issue of modification (§ 1682). 
[8] Id.-Foreign Decrees-Enforcement.-Where both parties are 
before California court, it may not properly refuse to hear 
plaintiff's prayer for enforcement of modifiable sister-state 
decree for separate maintenance and defendant's plea for 
modification of his obligations thereunder; if accrued install-
ments are modified retroactively, judgment for liquidated sum 
entered after such modification will be final and thus entitled 
to full faith and credit in other states; and if installments are 
modified prospectively, issues thus determined will be res 
judicata so long as circumstances of parties remain unchanged. 
[9] Id.-Foreign Decrees-Modification.-Issue of modification ot 
foreign maintenance or support decree need not, as matter of 
practical convenience, be tried in courts of state where such 
decree was originally rendered. 
[10] Evidence-Judicial Notice-Laws of Foreign State.-Law of 
state in which support obligation originated can be judicially 
noticed (Code Civ. Proc., § 1875) and applied by California 
courts. 
[11] Divorce-Foreign Decrees-Enforcement.-In action to en-
force modifiable support obligation either party may tender 
and litigate any plea for modification that could be presented 
to courts of state where alimony or support decree was origi-
nally rendered. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. John Gee Clark, Judge. Reversed. 
Action to enforce jUdgment of court of another state for 
separate maintenance. Judgment for defendant reversed. 
Kenny & Morris and Robert W. Kenny for Appellant. 
Slane, Mantaliea & Davis and Frank Barclay for Re-
spondent. 
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TRA YNOR, J .-Plaintiff appeals from a judgment barring 
further prosecution of this action. The judgment was entered 
after a trial of defendant's special defense (ClIde Civ. Proc., 
§ 597) to plaintiff's complaint for prospective and retroactive 
enforcement of defendant's obligations under a separate 
maintenance decree entered in the New Jersey Court of 
Chancery on May 19, 1947. Plaintiff and defendant were 
married in New Jersey in March 1943, and separated in 
November 1946. In the action for separate maintenance 
defendant appeared personally and by counsel, and the decree 
ordered him to pay $9.00 a week for plaintiff's support. 
About ten months after the decree was entered, defendant 
left New Jersey for Nevada, and in March 1948 he commenced 
an action for divorce in that state. Although plaintiff was 
served in New Jersey with summons and a copy of the 
complaint in the Nevada action, she did not appear therein. 
On JUly 7, 1948, the Nevada Second .Judicial District Court 
granted defendant a divorce. 
Defendant had paid all of the sums due under the New 
Jersey decree at the time the divorce was granted by the 
Nevada court but made no further payments thereafter. The 
Nevada decree contained no provision for alimony. On 
November 16, 1951, plaintiff commenced this action in the 
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, the county of de-
fendant's present residence. She alleged that the New Jersey 
decree "has become final and has never been vacated, modified, 
or set aside" and that defendant is delinquent in his pay-
ments thereunder in the amount of $1,089. She seeks a 
judgment for the accrued arrearages and asks that the New 
Jersey decree be established as a California decree and that 
defendant be ordered to pay her $9.00 a week until further 
order of the court. Defendant answered the complaint by a 
general denial and by alleging, as an affirmative defense, that 
the Nevada divorce decree had terminated his obligations 
under the earlier New Jersey separate maintenance decree. 
On defendant's motion, the affirmative defense was tried first 
under the procedure established by section 597 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure. The trial court concluded that the Nevada 
decree dissolved the marriage and was therefore a bar to the 
maintenance of an action to enforce defendant's obligations 
under the New Jersey decree. 
[1] Since plaintiff does not question the validity of the 
divorce granted by the Nevada court, that decree, being 
regular OD its face, must be accorded full faith and credit 
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in this state. (Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 
[63 8.0t. 207, 87 L.Ed. 279, 143 A.L.R. 1273]; Ibid., 325 
U.S. 226 [65 8.0t. 1092, 89 L.Ed. 1577, 157 A.L.R. 1366].) 
The controlling questions on this appeal are, therefore, (1) 
whether the dissolution of the marriage terminated defend-
ant's obligations under the New Jersey decree and, if not, 
(2) whether and to what extent those obligations are enforce-
able in this state. 
[2] Since the full faith and credit clause compels recog-
nition of the Nevada decree only as an adjudication of the 
marital status of plaintiff and defendant and not of any 
property rights that may be incident to that status (Estin v. 
Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 548-549 [68 8.0t. 1213, 92 L.Ed. 1561, 
1 A.L.R.2d 1412]), the effect of the dissolution of the marriage 
on defendant's preexisting obligations under the New Jersey 
maintenance decree must be determined by the law of New 
Jersey. (Ibid.; Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402, 406, 409 [72 
8.0t. 398, 96 L.Ed. 448] ; Bie'Wend v. Bie'Wend, 17 Ca1.2d 108, 
111, 114 [109 P.2d 701, 132 A.L.R. 1264].) [3] The 
Supreme Court of that state has recently held that a New 
Jersey "decree for maintenance [is not] superseded by a 
judgment of the foreign state where jurisdiction has only 
been obtained by publication entered in an ex parte proceed-
ing in which in personam jurisdiction over the wife to whom 
the maintenance decree runs was not obtained." (Isserman 
v. Isserman, 11 N.J. 106 [93 A.2d 571, 575],) We must 
therefore conclude that defendant's obligations under the 
New Jersey decree were not terminated by the dissolution 
of the marriage effected by the Nevada court in a proceeding 
in which personal jurisdiction over plaintiff was not obtained. 
The second question is more difficult. [4] Since the New 
Jersey decree is both prospectively and retroactively modi-
fiable (N.J.S. § 2A :34-23 [1951]), we are not constitutionally 
bound to enforce defendant's obligations under it. (Sistare 
v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 [30 8.0t. 682, 54 L.Ed. 905, 28 L.R. 
A.N.S. 1068] ; Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U.S. 183 [21 S~Ot. 555, 
45 L.Ed. 810]; Barber v. Barber, 21 How. (U.S.) 582 [16 
L.Ed. 226].)- Nor are we bound not to enforce them. 
-In reccnt cases the United States Supreme Court has expressly re-
served judgment on the question of full faith and credit to modifiable 
judgments and decrees (see Barber v. Eal'ber, 323 U.S. 77, 81 [65 S.Ct. 
137, 89 L.Ed. 82, 157 A.L.R. 163]; Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 234 
[66 S.Ct. 556, 90 L.Ed. 635]; but Bee lJalvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 
615 [67 s.Ot. 903, 91 L.Ed. 1133]), and the late Mr. Justice Jackson, a 
fOl"eIn08t expounder of the law of full faith and credit ill recent yeara, 
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(Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 615 [67 8.Ot. 903, 91 L.Ed. 
1133] ; Oummings v. Oummings, 97 Cal.App. 144, 151 [275 
P. 245].) The United States Supreme Court has held, how-
ever, that if such obligations are enforced in this state, at 
least as to accrued arrearages, due process requires that the 
defendant be afforded an opportunity to litigate the question 
of modification. (Griffin· v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 233-234 
[66 8.Ct. 556, 90 L.Ed. 635] ; see also Gough v. Gough, 101 
Cal.App.2d 262, 267-268 [225 P.2d 668].) It has also clearly 
indicated that as to either prospective or retroactive enforce-
ment of such obligations, this state "has at least as much 
leeway to disregard the judgment, to qualify it, or to depart 
from it as does the State where it was rendered." (Halvey v. 
Halvey, supra, 330 U.S. 610, 615.) 
In Biewend v. Biewend, 17 Ca1.2d 108, 113-114 [l09 P.2d 
701, 132 A.L.R. 1264], it was held that the California courts 
will recognize and give prospective enforcement to a foreign 
alimony decree, even though it is subject to modification under 
the law of the state where it was originally rendered, by 
establishing it "as the decree of the California court with 
the same force and effect as if it had been entered in this 
state, including punishment for contempt if the defendant 
fails to comply. [Citations.]" Similar holdings in refer-
ence to both alimony and support decrees have repeatedly 
. been made by the District Courts of Appeal (see the cases 
cited in Biewend v. Biewend, supra, 17 Ca1.2d at 113; see 
also Starr v. Starr, 121 Cal.App.2d 633 [263 P.2d 675] 
[modifying prospectively a Nevada decree for child support] ; 
Toohey v. Toohey, 97 Cal.App.2d 84, 87 [217 P.2d 108]; 
Tomkins v. Tomkins, 89 Cal.App.2d 243, 250 [200 P.2d 821]) 
and by the courts of other states (Sackler v. Sackler (Fla.), 
47 So.2d 292, 294-295 [18 A.L.R.2d 856] ; Rule v. Rule, 
313 Ill.App. 108 [39 N.E.2d 379]; Matson v. Matson, 186 
Iowa 607, 625 [173 N.W. 127]; Fanchier v. Gammill, 148 
Miss. 723, 737 [114 So. 813] ; Little v. Little, 146 Misc. 231, 
233 [262 N.Y.S. 654], affirmed without opinion, 236 App. 
Div. 826 [259 N.Y.S. 973], rearg. den., 237 App.Div. 817 
forcefully declared that modifiable alimony and support decrees are 
within the scope of that clause: " Neither the full faith and credit 
clause of the constitution nor the Act of Congress implementing it says 
anything about final judgments or, for that matter, about any judgments. 
Both require that full faith and credit be given to 'judicial proceedings' 
without limitation as to finality. Upon recognition of the broad mean-
ing of that term much may 80Illf'(by depend." (Concurring opinion, 
Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77,87 [65 S.Ct. 137, 89 L.Ed. 82, 157 A.L.R. 
163].) 
) 
470 WORTHLEY fJ. WORTHLEY [44 C.2d 
[260 N.Y.S. 981]; Lockman v. Lockman, 220 N.C 95, 98 
[16 S.E.2d 670] ; Oousineau v. Oousineau, 155 Ore. 184, 201-
202 [63 P.2d 897]; Johnson v. Johnson, 194 S.C. 115 [8 
S.E.2d 351, 354] ; Sorensen v. Spence, 65 S.D. 134 [272 N.W. 
179, 180-181] ; McKeel v. McICeel, 185 Va. 108, 113 [37 S.E. 
2d 746] ; see also ICnwaml v. J(1'uvand (Fla.), 59 So.2d 857; 
Ostrander v. Ostrander, 190 Minn. 547, 549-550 [252 N.W. 
449]; Shibley v. Shibley, 181 \Vash. 166 [42 P.2d 446].) It 
was stated in the Biewend case, however, that the Missouri 
decree would be established as a decree of the California 
courts "until such time as the Missouri court modifies itJJ 
decree." (17 Ca1.2d 108, 114.) On reconsideration we have 
concluded, for reasons that appear below, that this state!tlent 
was erroneous insofar as it implied that the California e.ourts 
will not try the issue of modification on its merits, and that 
the courts of this state should undertake to try sneh issues.· 
The District Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate 
District in a recent case has prospectively modifit!d a support 
obligation created in a Nevada decree. (Starr v. Starr, supra, 
121 Cal.App.2d 633.) In that case the plaintiff-wife obtained 
a divorce in Nevada in 1949, at which time she was awarded 
\!ustody of her minor child and the defenda.ut-husband was 
ordered to contribute $25 per month towaId the support of 
the child. Subsequently the wife and child became residents 
of California, and in 1951 she brought an action asking that 
the husband's support payments be increased to $75 per 
month. In affirming the trial court's order increasing the 
husband's obligation to $75 per month, the District Court 
of Appeal drew an analogy to Sampsell v. Super·ior Oourt, 
32 Ca1.2d 763 [197 P.2d 739], in which it was held that 
custody rights established in one state were modifiable in 
any other state that had jurisdiction over the subject matter. 
The court concluded that if the California courts could mod-
ify the custody rights created in the Nevada decree, there 
was no reason why the support obligation created in the 
same decree could not also be modified. Similarly, the courts 
of a number of other states have affirmed their willingness 
to undertake prospective modification of alimony and support 
obligations created in sister-state decrees. (See Blauvelt v. 
Blauvelt, 199 Ark. 710 [136 S.W.2d 201, 204J; Sackler v. 
·Similarly, IIandscllY v. l1and;;;chy, 32 Ca1.App.2d 504 [90 P.2d 123]. 
and Rarns v. Barns, 9 CaJ.App.2d 427 rriO P.2d 4631. are disapproved 
insofar as they are ineonsistcnt with this opinion on the question of the 
li~abilitl of the isaue of moditication. 
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Hackler, (Fla.), supra, 47 So.2d 292, 294-295 [18 A.L.R.2d 
856] ; Lopez v. Avery (Fla.), 66 So.2d 689, 693; Durfee v. 
Durfee, 293 Mass. 472, 477-479 [200 N.E. 395] ; Turnage v. 
Tyler, 183 Miss. 318 [184 So. 52] ; Robison v. Robison, 9 N.J. 
288 [88 A.2d 202, 204], cert. den. 344 U.S. 829 [73 8.Ct. 33, 
97 L.Ed. 645] ; Johnson v. Johnson, 196 S.C. 474 [13 S.E.2d 
593, 595-596, 134 A.L.R. 318] ; Setzer v. Setzer, 251 Wis. 234, 
236-237 [29 N.W.2d 62], citing Halvey v. Halvey, supra, 330 
U.S. 610, 615; see also Barclay v. Marston, 123 N.Y.S.2d 196, 
aff'd. without opinion, 127 N.Y.S.2d 842.) 
Although the question of retroactive modification has been 
seldom litigated, the United States Supreme Court has ex-
pressed its approval of the proposition that actions to en-
force retroactively modifiable decrees sho"lld be tried in a 
forum that has personal jurisdiction over both parties, and 
that in the trial of such actions the defendant must be afforded 
an opportunity to set up any mitigating defenses that would 
be available to him if the suit were brought in the state 
where the alimony or support decree was originally rendered. 
(Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 233-234 [66 8.Ct. 556, 90 
L.Ed. 635] ; see also Gough v. Go-ugh, 101 Cal.App.2d 262, 
267-268 [225 P.2d 668].) The same rule has been expressed 
by the Supreme Court of New Jersey (0 'Loughlin v. O'Lough-
lin, 6 N.J. 170 [78 A.2d 64, 68-69] ; see also Johnson v. John-
so-n, 196 S.C. 474 [13 S.E.2d 593, 595-596, 134 A.L.R. 318] ; 
Robison v. Robison, supra, 9 N.J. 288 [88 A.2d 202, 204], 
cert. den. 344 U.S. 829 [73 S.Ct. 33, 97 L.Ed. 645]), and its 
adoption has been commended by scholars who have recently 
studied the problem. (See Scoles, It Enforcement of Foreign 
'Non-Final' Alimo-ny and Support Orders," 53 Columb.L. 
Rev. 817, 823-825; Ehrenzweig, "lnierstate Recognitio-n of 
Support Duties," 42 Cal.L.Rev. 382, 393-394.) 
It is contended, however, that a contrary rule has been 
established in California by MacDonald v. Butler, 68 Cal. 
App.2d 120 [156 P.2d 273]. That case was an action to 
recover installments accrued under a retroactively modifiable 
Michigan decree for the support of minor children. The 
District Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of dismissal 
entered on defendant'8 demurrer to the complaint, and it 
is contended that because the case was decided on demurrer 
it necessarily holds that no cause of action was stated under 
full faith and credit, comity, or otherwise. This contention 
reflects a failure to distinguish between the decision as res 
jGdicata aDd as .t.. ae~is. [5] It is well established 
) 
) 
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that "cases are not authority for propositions not considered 
therein" (Metcalf v. Oounty of Los Angeles, 24 Cal.2d 267, 
273 [148 P.2d 645]; see also Maguire v. Hiberrvia Save &-
L. Soc., 23 Cal.2d 719, 730 [146 P.2d 673, 151 A.L.R. 1062] ; 
Mortgage Guaranty 00. v. Ohotiner, 8 Cal.2d 110, 114 [64 
P.2d 138, 108 A.L.R. 1080]; Oate v. Fresno Traction 00., 
213 Cal. 190, 202-203 [2 P .2d 364]; Webster v. Fall, 266 
U.S. 507,511 [45 8.Ct. 148,69 L.Ed. 411]; Schram v. Rob-
ertson, (9 Cir.) 111 F.2d 722, 725) and, since the report of 
the MacDonald case clearly indicates that it was argued and 
decided solely on the question of full faith and credit, its 
authority as precedent is limited to the decision on that 
question. [6] Moreover, propositions of law laid down in 
opinions of the District Courts of Appeal are not binding 
on this court. (Western L. 00. v. State Board of Equaliza-
tion, 11 Ca1.2d 156, 167-168 [78 P.2d 731, 117 A.L.R. 838] ; 
Shelton V. Oity of Los Angeles, 206 Cal. 544, 550 [275 P. 
421] ; People v. Rabe, 202 Cal. 409, 418-419 [261 P. 303]; 
1n re Stevens, 197 Cal. 408, 423-424 [241 P. 88]; Bohn V. 
Bohn, 164 Cal. 532, 537-538 [129 P. 981]; People V. Daw, 
147 Cal. 346, 350 [81 P. 718].) 
It is suggested that even if there are no binding California 
authorities on the question, we should follow certain sister-
state decisions holding that alimony and support obligations 
created by a prospectively and retroactively modifiable decree 
are enforceable only in the state in which the decree was ren-
dered. The policy implicit in those decisions is that a modi-
fiable duty of support in one state" is of no special interest to 
other states and . . . is not enforceable elsewhere under prin-
ciples of Conflict of Laws. " (Rest., Conflict of Laws, 
§ 458, comment a.) This policy was rejected by this court in 
the Biewend case (see also Hiner v. Hiner, 153 Cal. 254, 257 
[94 P. 1044]) and by the Legislature of this state in enacting 
the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. (Code 
Civ. Proc., §§ 1650-1690.) [7] In proceedings commenced 
pursuant to the provisions of that act, the California courts 
must recognize and enforce foreign alimony and support de-
crees whether modifiable or not (Code Civ. Proc., § 1670), and 
must afford the defendant an opportWlity to litigate the issue 
of modification. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1682; Griffin V. Griffin, 
supra, 327 U.S. 220, 233-234.) If we should now refuse to 
follow the policy expressed by the Legislature in the Uniform 
Act, and by this court and the United States Supreme Court 
in the Sampsell and Griffin cases, and should hold that even 
Apr. 1955] WORTHLEY tJ. WORTHLEY 
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though the courts of this state have personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant, his obligations under a prospectively and retro-
actively modifiable sister-state support decree cannot be en-
forced in this state, the result would be anomalous. There would 
then be two rules in California, one for proceedings com-
menced under the Uniform Act, and a contrary one for all 
other proceedings to enforce foreign-created alimony and 
support obligations. 
[8] Moreover, there is no valid reason, in a case in which 
both parties are before the court, why the California courts 
should refuse to hear a plaintiff '8 prayer for enforcement of a 
modifiable sister-state decree and the defendant's plea for 
modification of his obligations thereunder. If the accrued in-
stallments are modified retroactively, the judgment for a 
liquidated sum entered after such modification will be final 
and thus will be entitled to full faith and credit in all other 
states. (Magnolw. Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 438-
439, and cases cited.) If the installments are modified 
prospectively, the issues thus determined will be res judicata 
so long as the circumstances of the parties remain unchanged. 
(Snyder v. Snyder, 219 Cal. 80, 81 l25 P.2d 403] ; Ralphs v. 
Ralphs, 86 Cal.App.2d 324, 32..5 [194 P.2d 592); Molema v. 
Molema, 103 Cal.App. 79, 81 [283 P. 956).) Furthermore, the 
interests of neither party would be served by requiring the 
plaintiff to return to the state of rendition and reduce her 
claim for accrued installments to a money judgment. In the 
present case, for example, defendant, a domiciliary of this 
state, would have to travel 3,000 miles from his home, family, 
and job to secure a modification of plaintiff's allegedly stale 
claim and to protect his interests in any proceeding for the 
enforcement of his support obligation that she might institute 
in New Jersey. If defendant is unable to afford the time or 
money to travel to New Jersey to make an effective appearance 
in plaintiff's proceedings in that state, his substantive defenses 
to plaintiff's claims will be foreclosed. By the same token, 
unless plaintiff elected to proceed under the Uniform Recip-
rocal Enforcement of Support Act,· which has been adopted 
in New Jersey (N.J.S. § 2A :4-30.1-30.22), defendant's failure 
to pay the installments as they came due would force her con-
stantly to relitigate his obligation to support. Repeated suits 
for arrearages would have to be brought in New Jersey as in-
·Code Civ. Proc., § 1654: "The remedies provided in this title [the 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act] are in addition to and 
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stallments accrued, to be followed by repeated actions in Cali-
fornia to enforce the New Jersey judgments for accrued in-
stallments, with the net result that the costs of litigation and 
the dilatoriness of the recovery would substantially reduce the 
value of the support to which plaintiff is entitled. 
[9] Furthermore, there is no merit to the contention that 
as a matter of practical convenience the issue of modification 
should be tried in the courts of the state where the support 
decree was originally rendered. Proof of changed circum-
stances in support cases is no more difficult than in custody 
cases and, as noted above, a California court that has juris-
diction of the subject matter must undertake to adjudicate a 
plea for modification of custody rights established by a sister-
state decree. (Sampsell v. Superior Oourt, 32 Ca1.2d 763 [197 
P.2d 739].) [10] Moreover, in most states the problem of 
modification is dealt with according to general equitable prin-
ciples, and the law of the state in which the support obliga-
tion originated can be judicially noticed (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1875) and applied by the California courts. 
[11] Accordingly, we hold that foreign-created alimony 
and support obligations are enforceable in this state. In an 
action to enforce a modifiable support obligation, either party 
may tender and litigate any plea for modification that could be 
presented to the courts of the state where the alimony or sup-
port decree was originally rendered. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., and Carter, J., concurred. 
SPENCE, J.-I dissent. 
This case is before us on rehearing. On the first hearing, 
no claim was made that the prior New Jersey decree for plain-
tiff's support was modifiable retroactively as well as prospec-
tively. We therefore assumed in our first opinion that such 
support decree was a final judgment, and that it "was en-
titled to full faith and credit in California." (W orthley v. 
Worthley, (Cal.) 267 P.2d 23.) Upon rehearing, it has been 
shown that the New Jersey support decree was not a final 
judgment for the reason that it was modifiable both retro-
actively and prospectively under the law of New Jersey. The 
majority opinion therefore concedes that "we are not con-
stitutionally bound to enforce defendant's obligations under 
it," but it holds that the trial court should have enforced the 
New Jersey decree with such modifications as might have ap-
peared proper. I cannot coneur in these view .. 
) 
) 
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Prior to the decision in the present case, this state bas never 
sanctioned the modification by its courts of any decree of a 
sister state for the support of a wife. (Biewend v. Biewend, 
17 Ca1.2d 108 [109 P.2d 701, 132 A.L.R. 1264] ; Handschy v. 
Handschy, 32 CaLApp.2d 504 [90 P.2d 123] ; Barns v. Barns, 
9 Cal.App.2d 427 [50 P.2d 463].) I would adhere to the es-
tablished law of this state and avoid the confusion which is 
bound to result from the disapproval of the above-cited cases. 
(See Barns v. Barns, supra, p. 430.) 
Furthermore, the New Jersey judgment which plaintiff seeks 
to enforce in California is modifiable retroactively, as well as 
prospectively, under the law of New Jersey; but the majority 
opinion nevertheless requires its enforcement and modification 
by the courts of this state. This will result in confusion worse 
confounded, as the courts of each of several states, including 
New Jersey, might be called upon to modify the same decree, 
both retroactively as well as prospectively. In my opinion, the 
New Jersey decree, until made final by the courts of that 
state, is based upon shifting sands, which furnish no firm 
foundation upon which to predicate a judgment in any other 
jurisdiction. 
The courts of New York dealt with a similar New Jersey 
decree in 1948. (Ohampey v. 01wrnpey, 80 N.Y.S.2d 206.) 
The wife there sought to enforce the New Jersey decree in the 
courts of New York. The judgment in favor of the wife was 
reversed by the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, and it 
said: "This action could not be maintained until the amount 
of the arrears accruing under the decree obtained in New 
Jersey, was definitely fixed by the courts of that state. This 
was not done here. Madden v. Madden, 136 N.J. Eq. 132 [40 
A.2d 611]." The wife then had the amount fixed by the New 
Jersey court and thereafter obtained enforcement of such 
final judgment in the courts of New York. (Oharnpey v. 
Ckampey, 92 N.Y.S.2d 838.) 
With respect to the admittedly valid Nevada decree of 
divorce which followed after the New Jersey decree for support 
of the wife, this court has held that such a divorce decree 
terminates all rights to further payments under a prior decree 
for wife support, even though the prior support decree was 
entered in this state. (Cardinale v. Oardinale, 8 Ca1.2d 762 
[68 P.2d 351].) The majority does not mention the Cardinale 
case. It seems illogical to me for this court to hold that the 
tl~ai courts here must enforce, as a matter of comity, a prior 
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actively and prospectively, when it held in the Cardinale case 
that it would not enforce, under similar circumstances, a prior 
California support decree which was modifiable only pros-
pectively. 
Certain cases cited in the majority opinion are clearly dis-
tinguishable. They involved in effect the modification by our 
courts of fureign decrees with respect to tho custody and sup-
port of children who had become domiciled in this state. Such 
matters as custody and support of children are not subject to 
binding contracts between the parents, no fina] judgment is 
ever entered anywhere with respect to such custody and sup-
port, and the state where the children may become domiciled 
has a paramount interest in the welfare of such children. 
The majority opinion makes reference to the Uniform Recip-
rocal Enforcement of Support Act. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1650-
1690.) A reading of that act shows that it has no bearing on 
the problem before us. It sets up certain procedures for 
criminal and civil enforcement, but when the civil procedures 
are followed and this state acts as a responding state, it makes 
its own initial determination of the amount of support to be 
imposed. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1682-1683.) 
Further, the majority assumes that the present law places 
a hardship on plaintiff" by requiring the plaintiff to return" 
to New Jersey to obtain a final judgment before seeking to 
enforce it here. There is nothing in the record to show that 
plaintiff is not still residing in New Jersey or that the law of 
New Jersey would require her actual presence for the purpose 
of obtaining such final judgment. It appears to me far better 
to require that the New Jersey decree should be made final in 
that state before the courts of this state should be compelled 
to attempt its enforcement or modification. 
Under the cited cases, plaintiff has stated no cause of action 
for enforcement or modification of the New Jersey decree. 
The trial court therefore properly denied plaintiff any relief, 
and regardless of the ground upon which the trial court may 
have based its ruling, I would affirm the judgment. 
Shenk, J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
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